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Businesses often benefit by forming alliances with other firms but risk becoming dependent on
their partners. We discuss two situations in which dependence may create serious problems:
first. if a partner shuts down and. second. if a partner forms a relationship with a new partner.
We examine collaborative relationships formed by businesses operating in the U.S. hospital
software systems industry during the 1961-91 period. We find that businesses faced increased
risk of dissolution if they did not form new partnerships after partners shut down or formed
collaborative relationships with new partners. The results have implications for del-eloping an
evolutionary theory of business strategy and performance. Our approach implies that the
performance of a focal business often depends 011 how the strategies of its business partners
evolve over time. An evolutionary theory of strategy must incorporate key characteristics of
actions and relationships throughout a web of business partnerships. The dual nature of
interfirm relationships. which both help a business survive at one time and inhibit its ability
to adapt at another. helps explain why so many successful businesses fail when their environ-
ments change.
Formal interfirm collaboration has become an
important means by which businesses in many
industries gain access to capabilities needed to
compete in changing markets. Empirical research
suggests that collaborating firms sometimes real-
ize corporate financial benefits (Berg, Duncan,
and Friedman, 1982; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1994) and survival advantages (Miner, Ambur-
gey, and Stearns, 1990; Baum and Oliver, 1991;
Mitchell and Singh, 1996). Authors in several
research traditions, though, note that collaborating
firms risk becoming dependent on their partners
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(Simon, 1969; Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and
Marsden, 1978: 461-462; Weick, 1979: 185-
187; Williamson, 1991a: 291, 1991b; Burt, 1992;
Barnett, 1994). Dependence on an ally may leave
a business in a precarious position if a partnership
changes, but how changes in cooperative relation-
ships affect the performance of allied businesses
has received little theoretical or empirical atten-
tion (Dodgson, 1992). This paper investigates
whether businesses become more likely to fail
after a partner either shuts down or forms a
collaborative agreement with a new partner.
The research has two goals. Our first goal is
to demonstrate that interfirm collaboration has
opposing influences on business performance. By
collaboration, we mean cooperative agreements
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between legally separable organizations that do
not involve establishing separate organizations
(Masten, 1988; Williamson, 199Ia). The study
brings together perspectives that view collabo-
ration as primarily beneficial with views that
emphasize the problems that collaboration can
cause. By combining these approaches in a longi-
tudinal study, we show that substantial negative
influences sometimes counter the positive main
effects of collaboration. The empirical analysis
examines the U.S. hospital software systems
industry between 1961 and 1991 and evaluates
973 businesses that commercialized applications
software during this period. We focus on develop-
ment-oriented and marketing-oriented collabo-
rative relationships used in the industry. Previous
research using this data source suggests that firms
find it difficult to adapt following exogenous
environmental shocks that affect the focal purpose
of a collaborative relationship (Mitchell and
Singh, 1996). This study investigates the impact
of the failure of a partner and of the addition of
a new relationship by a partner.
Our second goal is to contribute to an evo-
lutionary theory of business strategy and perform-
ance. Our approach implies that the performance
of a focal business often depends on how the
strategies of its business partners evolve over
time. Therefore, an evolutionary theory of strat-
egy and performance must incorporate key
characteristics of actions and relationships in busi-
ness partnerships. This issue is particularly rel-
evant to current efforts to develop a resource-
based view of the firm, which views business
strategy and performance as outcomes of organi-
zation-specific choices and capabilities. Our work
emphasizes that a firm's critical resources may
span firm boundaries and may become embedded
in collaboration-specific interfirm routines and
systems. In turn, this emphasis highlights the
managerial requirement for successful firms both
to develop systems for coordinating behavior with
business partners and to maintain independent
strength when a partner provides key skills.
BACKGROUND AND PREDICTIONS
Our discussion of collaboration applies to com-
mercialization activities that involve substantial
complexity. By commercialization, we mean the
process of acquiring ideas, augmenting them with
complementary knowledge, developing and manu-
facturing salable goods, and selling the goods in
a market. Complexity arises when components of
an applied system have multiple interactions and
constitute a nondecomposable whole (Simon,
1969; Huberman and Hogg, 1986; Singh, 1993).
Commercialization complexity is common in
many business situations, including product and
process innovation, geographic expansion, product
line extension, and product market entry. Busi-
nesses sometimes take independent approaches in
complex business situations, by carrying out some
activities internally and contracting for other
activities through hands-off relationships with
other organizations. In contrast with independent
approaches, some businesses collaborate closely
with other firms to carry out some commerciali-
zation activities in complex business situations,
using a vast and changing set of collaboration
methods (Richardson, 1972; Contractor and
Lorange, 1988; Oliver, 1990; Powell, 1990;
Hamel, 1991; Teece, 1992).
Relative to independent approaches, interfirm
relationships create both benefits and difficulties
for collaborating businesses (Mitchell and Singh,
1996). Collaborative approaches assist auton-
omous businesses to gain effective access to
knowledge held by other organizations and to
achieve close configuration of the components of
complex goods and services, while also main-
taining and improving their skills in their respect-
ive specializations (Langlois and Robertson,
1992). Firms sometimes realize corporate finan-
cial benefits by cooperating (Berg et al., 1982;
Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad, 1989; Balakrishnan
and Koza, 1993; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1994). Several studies show that organizations
with links to central social organizations are more
likely to survive than businesses that lack such
social legitimacy (Miner et al., 1990; Baum and
Oliver, 1991; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett,
1993).
Along with its advantages, collaboration also
creates potential problems, including risks of los-
ing proprietary information to a partner (Jorde
and Teece, 1990; Hamel, 1991) and adaptation
difficulties imposed by high adjustment costs and
the absorption of interorganizational routines.
Establishing and renewing cooperative agreements
is often costly (Coase, 1937, 1960; Akerloff,
1970), while businesses also frequently develop
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they learn to collaborate (Fombrun, 1988). Inter-
dependence arising from the interorganizational
routines often makes it difficult for a single part-
ner to act independently (Laumann et al., 1978:
461-462; Weick, 1979: 185-187; Williamson,
1991a: 291). Barnett (1994) refers to problems
that result from collaboration as liabilities of col-
lective action. As a general empirical outcome,
businesses with collaborative agreements will
tend to outperform businesses that take inde-
pendent approaches in complex business situ-
ations, if managers are at least intendedly rational
in their approach to interfirm relationships. None-
theless, severe negative influences may arise if
unanticipated problems occur after the formation
of collaborative relationships.
Our central assumption is that collaborating
businesses often become intertwined. In order to
access their partner's capabilities, collaborating
firms establish channels for information, person-
nel and goods exchange, and merge at least some
of their routines and procedures, all of which
cause the organizations to become enmeshed.
Intertwining could take the form of sharing key
personnel, marketing systems, development facili-
ties, and other business systems (Levinthal and
Fichman, 1988). Once they become intertwined,
each business in a partnership comes to rely on
the other firm' s capabilities (Simon, 1969; Ald-
rich and Whetten, 1981; Williamson, 1991 a;
Miles and Snow, 1992). Generally, the closer the
intertwining, the more effective the relationship
and the greater the dependence between partners.
As a result, businesses will suffer if they lose
partners or experience a reduction in the effec-
tiveness of relationships and cannot replace the
relationships with effective alternatives (Burt,
1992).
We address two situations in which dependence
on a partner may cause problems: cases in which
partners shut down and cases in which partners
form collaborative agreements with new partners.
We first consider the negative effects of a part-
ner's failure or formation of new partnerships.
We then consider alternative explanations for
observed relationships between business survival
and partner failure or new partnerships.
Business survival is the outcome measure of the
study. We record exits when businesses shut down.
Business dissolution is an appropriate measure for
situations in which interfirm collaboration plays a
central role in business strategy. Examining business
survival is particularly important in such cases
because studies that examine the financial perform-
ance of surviving firms are less likely to detect
collaboration problems that caused business failure.
Survival is a common measure in ecological studies
and is receiving increasing attention as an important
performance variable in the strategy literature. We
record survival at the business level rather than
corporate level of analysis because collaboration
is primarily a business-level phenomenon, so that
corporate-level analyses may conceal underlying
business unit performance. Business survival is
equivalent to firm survival for single-business firms,
but firms that operate in several industries often
discontinue businesses while continuing to operate
as corporations.
Partner failure
We expect businesses to face increased risk of
shutting down if a partner shuts down, if they
cannot replace the failed partner. When an organi-
zation shuts down, as Hannan and Freeman
(1989: 150) put it, 'whatever it claims to be doing
is no longer done'. When a partner shuts down,
businesses that collaborated with the dissolved
business usually lose access to capabilities that
were the purpose of the collaboration. Some busi-
nesses may be able to internalize the partner's
capabilities after a partner fails, either by internal
development or by purchasing assets of the failed
business. However, firms usually form inter-
organizational relationships because they lack the
ability, time, or money needed to internalize
necessary capabilities. Instead, businesses that
lose partners will often need to find new partners
that possess the needed capabilities. If a business
can attract a replacement partner with needed
skills, then the business often will be able to
overcome the problems caused by the loss of a
partner. If the collaborators of the dissolved busi-
ness cannot switch to new partners, then they too
may fail. There is no strong argument for how
quickly the replacement must take place. We will
take a conservative approach in the empirical
analysis, by examining replacements for several
years following partner failure.
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that a business
will shut down will increase if the business
does not form a new collaborative relationship
after a partner shuts down.102 K. Singh and W. Mitchell
We will also investigate whether partner divesti-
ture influences business survival. Partner divesti-
ture is the sale of a business partner as an
ongoing business to new ownership. Partner
divestiture might have a negative influence on
business survival if the process of selling a busi-
ness tends to disrupt collaborative links with busi-
ness partners. Disruption might occur because the
new owners change personnel policies, reorganize
development facilities and marketing systems, or
adjust their collaboration strategies. In many
cases, though, the new ownership will preserve
collaborative linkages, often with little change.
Indeed, the existence of the collaborative relation-
ships sometimes is part of the attractiveness of
the business to the new owner. Therefore, partner
divestiture is likely to have less impact than
partner dissolution on business survival and might
have no effect at all.
Partner forms new partnership
We also expect that a business will face increased
risks of shutting down if a partner establishes
a relationship with a new partner. Arguments
concerning trading opportunities and organiza-
tional constraints underlie this prediction. The
opportunities to trade tend to increase for busi-
nesses that add new partners, which will affect
both the balance of power with existing allies
and the need for the resources provided by exist-
ing allies. As a result of the increased trading
opportunities, businesses that add new partners
will often improve their negotiating positions with
their existing allies (Burt, 1992: 229-238) and
thereby gain greater power in determining the
terms of financial and other transactions between
the firms. Also as a result of the increased trading
opportunities, businesses that add new partners
may reduce their trade with prior partners in
favor of relationships that provide resources more
suited to current needs. Firms often commit sub-
stantial resources to partnerships and are vulner-
able to a deemphasis of relationships by partners
(Williamson, 1991a). Thus, businesses may suffer
if their bargaining positions and trading activities
decline when partners add new relationships.
A complementary explanation for a business's
increased risk of failure when a partner adds a
new partner draws from the view that organiza-
tions face significant constraints on their activi-
ties. This view is central to ecological and eco-
nomic theories of evolutionary organizational
change and performance (e.g., Hannan and Free-
man, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982) and to
perspectives that emphasize the importance of
organization-specific resources (e.g., Penrose,
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Conner,
1991; Amit and Schoernaker, 1993). Internal and
external constraints may restrict the resources that
businesses can devote to interfirm relationships.
Internal constraints arise because businesses have
limited financial resources and organizational
capabilities with which to conduct interfirm
relationships, so that firms that form new relation-
ships will often reduce their commitment to exist-
ing relationships. External constraints arise
because new partners may place explicit or
implicit restrictions on the resources that a busi-
ness devotes to older relationships. Businesses
that have come to depend on their partners'
resources may fail if their partners deemphasize
relationships owing to the internal and external
constraints.
In summary, we expect that many businesses
will suffer when partners establish new relation-
ships, whether because the allies gain negotiating
power, have less need to trade with earlier part-
ners, or can devote fewer resources to prior
relationships. We expect businesses to face prob-
lems whether a partner adds a partner with differ-
ent capabilities from those of the focal business
or adds a partner with similar capabilities. If a
partner adds a new partner with similar capabili-
ties, the new relationship will tend to create
competition for the focal firm. If a partner adds
a new partner with different capabilities, the part-
ner may shift the emphasis of its managerial time
and financial resources. As we argued in the prior
section, a business may be able to overcome the
problems by forming a new partnership with
another firm. However, we expect that a business
will face increased risk of shutting down if it
cannot create a new relationship after a partner
forms a collaborative relationship with another
firm.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that a business
will shut down will increase if a business does
not form a new collaborative relationship after
a partner adds a new partner.
The statistical analysis also will control the effect
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tends to cause greater business dissolution rates
(Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Evans, 1987; Mitchell,
1994), we expect partner size to have no general
influence on business survival. If allying with
large businesses provided survival advantages
then, conversely, allying with small businesses
would create survival difficulties. In such cases,
only large businesses would tend to collaborate.
Empirically, however, there are many cases in
which small businesses form relationships, both
with other small businesses and with large busi-
nesses. We do not expect managers to ally with
small businesses if such collaboration systemati-
cally reduces their businesses' survival chances.
Causality between collaboration and survival
An issue that arises when we consider the hypoth-
eses is whether partner failure and new partner-
ships cause business failure or, alternatively,
whether another cause underlies both business
failure and partner actions. An alternative expla-
nation for Hypothesis I is that two weak busi-
nesses might shut down together. Another alterna-
tive explanation for the prediction is that the two
businesses shut down as the result of facing a
common external factor. We will take two steps
to help address these alternatives. First, we will
include several business-level and industry-level
characteristics as control variables in the statisti-
cal analyses. Business-level characteristics include
business age, business sales, sales growth, product
line breadth, and other corporate product lines.
Industry-level characteristics include market size,
market growth, and exit incidence. Second, we
will test for both contemporaneous business dis-
solution and lagged dissolution following the loss
of a partner. We will define contemporaneous
dissolution as dissolution during the same calen-
dar year and then will examine dissolution lags
during the subsequent 4 years. We would expect
contemporaneous dissolution to be common if
two businesses shut down owing to a common
cause. If, instead, business dissolution tends to
occur in the years subsequent to partner disso-
lution, then the results would support the argu-
ment that the first dissolution contributed to the
second.
An alternative explanation for results consistent
with Hypothesis 2 would be that firms might add
new partners in anticipation of the failure of
an existing partner. The business strength and
dissolution timing variables will help address this
issue, as they did for the test of the first hypoth-
esis. We will also differentiate between cases in
which partners add new partners of the same type
as an existing relationship and cases in which
partners add new partners of a different type,
distinguishing between development-oriented and
marketing-oriented relationships. We would
expect reverse causality to be more of a concern
in cases that involve relationships of the same
type, because a partner is most likely to add a
marketing (development) partner if it fears the
impending loss of an existing marketing
(development) relationship. No statistical pro-
cedure can control for all causality issues, but we
believe that these steps will provide confidence in
the results of the analysis.
THE HOSPITAL SOFTWARE
SYSTEMS INDUSTRY
We test the hypotheses by examining the survival
of businesses that entered the U.S. hospital
software systems industry between 1961 and
1991. The industry comprises firms that commer-
cialize applications software systems specifically
designed for administrative and clinical use in
community hospitals. Community hospitals
include all 'nonfederal short-term general and
other special hospitals, excluding hospital units
of institutions, whose facilities and services are
available to the public' (American Medical
Association, 1991: xxiii). The industry definition
excludes software businesses that develop gen-
eral-purpose applications such as word processing
and spreadsheet software. The definition also
excludes firms that only develop software for
nonhospital medical organizations such as group
practices, long-term care facilities, and psychiatric
hospitals. The challenges that businesses face in
developing systems for hospitals differ signifi-
cantly from developing systems for general use
and for nonhospital medical institutions. Hospital
software is commonly treated as a distinct vertical
market in business practice. In sensitivity analy-
sis, we included dummy variables denoting
whether businesses also sold nonhospital medical
software and nonmedical software, finding no
material change in the reported results.
The hospital software systems industry
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to use computers in research programs in the late
1950s. The first recorded entry of a hospital
software system business occurred in 1961. The
earliest systems automated patient management
and financial operations. Firms introduced com-
puter-based information systems for clinically ori-
ented laboratory, radiology, and other applications
in the mid-1960s. Hospital software systems sales
rose rapidly following the creation of the Med-
icare health insurance program in 1966. The pro-
gram indirectly underwrote many hospital capital
expenditures and gave hospital administrators
incentives to record costs so that the hospital
could obtain reimbursement from Medicare and
other third-party payers. Many hospitals began to
adopt administrative software systems during the
1970s and almost all hospitals employed adminis-
trative systems by 1979. Administrative systems
became broader reaching and more sophisticated
during the 1980s. Software systems used in clini-
cal departments of hospitals began to receive
widespread attention during the late 1970s. Most
hospitals now employ computer-based infor-
mation systems in major clinical departments
(Collen, 1991). Table I lists the 13 hospital
Table I. Hospital software system product classes
(first year sold; number of businesses that offered
products by 1991)
I. Accounting, business, and finance (1961; 491):
Financial and business office operations
2. Patient management (1961; 258): Patient
admissions, discharge, transfer, and scheduling
3. Materials management (1963; 170): Inventory
and purchasing management
4. Clinical laboratory (1964; 294): Laboratory
department management and test result reporting
5. Pharmacy (1965; 212): Inpatient and outpatient
pharmacy management
6. Radiology (1965; 148): Radiology department
management
7. Nursing (1965; 125): Nursing department
management
8. Other administrative (1966; 175): Miscellaneous
administration
9. Blood bank (1967; 34): Blood bank management
10. Patient care (1968; 218): Medical records
management
1I. Bedside (1969; 37): Point-of-care management
12. Operating room (1969; 82): Operating room
management
13. Dietary (1971 ; 57): Dietary management and
kitchen operations
software systems product classes included in the
study, and reports the introduction dates and the
number of businesses that have commercialized
systems in each class.
The data for this study comprise 973 businesses
that commercialized software systems for Amer-
ican hospitals. These businesses include all or
nearly all the businesses that operated in the
industry between 1961 and 1991. The firms
include computer hardware manufacturers that
also developed software systems, along with busi-
nesses that developed only software. The U.S.A.
was the home country of almost all businesses
in the study. We collected the data through an
extensive search of the business press, corporate
reports, government publications, and other public
sources. A list of sources is available on request.
In most cases we confirmed from corporate
reports, business histories, and discussions with
people familiar with the industry that the first
year of recorded participation was the first active
year in the industry. In the remaining cases (about
14%) we estimated the year of entry into the
industry based on the first year the business
appeared in an industry report, which is the usual
procedure in longitudinal studies of organizations.
The hospital software systems industry suits
the study because businesses have used both inde-
pendent and collaborative forms of organization
to commercialize the systems. Hospital software
systems are prime examples of complex goods
(J. L. Johnson Associates, 1975; Malvey, 1981;
Frost and Sullivan, 1982; Minard, 1991; Aller,
1992). Although some forms of hospital software
systems are more complicated than others, all
systems entail a substantial degree of complexity
owing to the complexity of the hospital environ-
ment, the high human costs of system failure,
rapid rates of change in medical and computer
technologies, and extensive external regulation
and monitoring. Therefore, collaborative relation-
ships have been common in the industry. Such
collaboration has involved joint development,
technology licensing agreements, marketing and
distribution agreements, and other forms of
interfirm cooperation. At the same time, however,
the systems are not so complex that a firm cannot
operate independently, either by relying on short-
term market relationships with other firms or
by internalizing the key activities required to
commercialize hospital software systems. Thus,
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mation concerning the relative success of busi-
nesses that have engaged in collaborative relation-
ships and businesses that operate independently.
We identified collaborative relationships
through an extensive review of published govern-
ment, business, and industry sources, augmented
with interviews with participants in the industry.
Our criterion for recognizing the existence of a
collaborative relationship was the formal
announcement of an agreement in a published
media. The announcement also served as the
means for classifying agreements, because almost
all reports described the nature or intent of
cooperation. The methods we used to collect
data on collaborative relationships are common
to studies that have relied retrospectively on pub-
lished sources for information, such as the CATI
data bank maintained by Hagedoorn and Schaken-
raad (1990). We classed businesses for which
there was no public record of collaborative
relationships as taking independent commerciali-
zation approaches. We believe that our search
identified the formation of most publicly reported
interfirm agreements.
We identified 693 cases in which businesses
operating in the hospital software systems indus-
try formed collaborative relationships, with such
agreements being created by 242 of the 973
businesses in the sample. Almost all agreements
were among businesses operating in the hospital
software systems industry. Adding a dummy vari-
able denoting that a partner was outside the indus-
try or unknown did not materially change the
results of the statistical estimates that we report
in the paper.
Although there undoubtedly have been private
agreements between individuals within businesses
and perhaps between the businesses themselves,
three reasons lead us to believe that most such
private agreements have limited significance com-
pared to the public agreements that we identified.
First, the many publications specializing on this
industry provide detailed coverage of most activi-
ties within the industry, including substantial
amounts of information that the businesses have
not deliberately released. Second, most significant
agreements are formal and legally binding, and
as such usually are public knowledge. Third,
businesses benefit from widespread knowledge
of most cooperative development and marketing
agreements in the industry and often publicize
them actively.
We omitted two types of interfirm agreements
from the collaboration classifications. We
defined cases in which one business purchased
another business as acquisition rather than col-
laboration. In addition, we defined 10 cases
in which businesses created free-standing joint
ventures as new businesses rather than as col-
laborations between autonomous organizations.
The characteristics of free-standing joint ven-
tures differ significantly from those of collabor-
ative relationships and sufficiently approximate
the characteristics of businesses that operate
independently to justify this treatment
(Williamson, 1991a: 293; Kay, 1992).
The collaboration data have two limitations.
First, we found that firms were much less likely
to report agreement termination than agreement
creation. By necessity, therefore, our records
report the cumulative number of interfirm
agreements that each business had created by
the end of each year of the study, rather than
the number of active agreements in each year.
This is a conservative limit for the tests of the
hypotheses concerning partner failure and new
partnerships. Undoubtedly, some businesses for
which we record alliances had terminated the
relationships before their partners failed or for-
med new relationships. Failure or new relation-
ships would have little or no impact on the
performance of ex-partners, which is counter
to the predicted impact, so that any such
instances will tend to reject the hypotheses
rather than support the predictions. The second
limit is that we were unable to control for the
quality of collaboration, which will directly
influence the risk of failure. A well-executed
collaborative relationship will have a more fav-
orable impact on business survival than an inef-
fective collaboration. The large number of col-
laborations limits adverse consequences,
because the data represent the entire range of
collaboration quality.
Table 2 describes the types of relationships
we identified, which we group into three categ-
ories: 135 cases of development-oriented
relationships, 509 cases of marketing-oriented
relationships, and 49 cases of other relation-
ships. The distinction between development and
marketing-oriented agreements is consistent
with Hagedoorn (1993), who found the two
classes to be the most common collaborative
links that businesses employ.106 K. Singh and W. Mitchell
Table 2. Types of collaborative relationships (693
cases)
I. Development-oriented collaboration (135 cases):
Joint R&D; joint development of product
interfaces or product compatibility; in-licensing of
products or components from another business
2. Market ing-oriented collaboration (509 cases): Joint
market ing or distribution; marketing or distribution
by one business of partners' products; software
business resells systems for hardware business
(may include information and resource sharing)
3. Other collaboration (49 cases) : Out-licensing
relationships (27 cases ) and agreements that could
not be classified (22 cases)
METHODS
We defined the sample at the parent company
level of analysis. We tracked each business from
its entry into the industry until it exited the
industry or until the end of the study period in
1991. We treated cases in which a parent com-
pany sold a business to another company as
industry exits, recording a business entry in such
cases if the acquiring company did not already
operate a hospital software system business. A
dummy variable identifies these cases in the
empirical analysis. The 973 businesses in the
study accounted for a total of 670 I business-
years of participation, which we refer to as rec-
ord years.
To create the dependent variable for the study,
we recorded whether businesses shut down in a
given record year. The variable took a value of
oif a business continued to participate at the end
of a year and I if it shut down during the year,
which occurred in 316 cases. This procedure
commonly is known as episode splitting or dis-
crete time event analysis (Allison, 1984; Rohwer.
1993a). We also identified 233 business divesti-
tures, which we treated as right-censored cases
(i.e., nonexits) in the analysis of business disso-
lution.
Tables 3 and 4 describe the independent vari-
ables and report summary statistics. Of the 693
collaborative relationships, 531 relationships (219
firms) involved unique pairwise partnerships in
which both firms operated in the hospital software
systems industry. The other cases included sub-
sequent agreements between the same pairs of
firms, cases involving a partner outside the indus-
try, and cases with one unknown partner. In order
to test the hypotheses, we identified instances
among the 531 cases of intraindustry partnership
in which partners exited or added new partners.
We also defined control variables addressing the
main effects of collaborative relationships (using
all 693 collaborative relationships), business
characteristics, and industry characteristics that
might influence business survival. The inde-
pendent variables include those reported by Mit-
chell and Singh (1996), while adding the partner
failure and new partnerships covariates along with
control variables for partner size, business sales
growth, and industry exits.
We calculated binomial logistic regression esti-
mates of the influences of the independent vari-
ables on the likelihood that a business would exit
the industry in each record year. The models took
the form In p;I( I - Pi) = I3Xi. In this equation, Pi
is the probability that business i will exit during
an observation year. The log odds of the prob-
ability is held to be linearly affected by a vector
of covariates Xi with coefficient vector 13
(including an intercept). The effect of a one-unit
change of covariate j on the probability that a
business will exit in an observation year is
I3jPi( I - Pi)' We obtained the maximum likelihood
estimates using the logistic regression procedure
of the SAS statistical package. Calculating logis-
tic regression estimates of influences on the likeli-
hood that a business will exit in each record year
is an appropriate method for this analysis because
it allows us to update the annual value of time-
varying covariates. As sensitivity analysis, we
estimated the effects of the hybrid interfirm
relationship variables on the exit rate, using the
exponential distribution of the TDA statistical
package (Rohwer, 1993a, 1993b). We found that
logistic regression and exponential baseline rate
estimates produced materially equivalent results.
RESULTS
Table 5 reports the results of the analysis, which
support the hypotheses. Column I provides pre-
liminary analysis by showing the main effects
of partner failure or new partnerships, without
distinguishing between businesses that formed
new relationships after partner failure or new
partnerships and businesses that did not form
relationships. In column 2, we limited the twoSurvival after Partners Fail or Form New Partnerships 107
Table 3. Definitions of independent variables and expected influence on business dissolution" (F = fixed value,
TV=time varying)
Partner failure or new partnerships
Partner dissolution. year 0, years 1- 4 (+): Dummy
variables noting that a partner shut down its
hospital software systems business during the
current year or that a partner was dissolved during
the 4-year lag period (TV)
Partner divestiture, year 0, years 1- 4 (?): Dummy
variables noting that a partner sold its hospital
software systems business during the current year
or that a partner was divested during the 4-year
lag period (TV)
Partner adds partner, same type, year O. years 1- 4
(+): Dummy variables denoting cases in which a
partner operating in the software systems industry
added a new partner of the same type (marketing-
oriented or development-oriented) as the existing
agreement (TV)
Partner adds partner, different type, year 0, years 1-4
(+): Dummy variables denoting cases in which a
partner operating in the hospital software systems
industry added a new partner of a different type
(marketing-oriented or development-oriented ) from
the existing agreement (TV)
Business adds partner after partner dissolution, years
0-4 (0): Dummy variable denoting cases in which
a business added a partner after a partner shut
down (TV)
Business adds partner after partner adds partner, years
0- 4 (0): Dummy variable denoting cases in which
a business added a partner after a partner added a
new partner (TV)
Collaborative relationships
Partner size (0): Annual hospital software systems
sales by a business's largest partner ($ million
deflated by 1982 PPI, TV)
Development collaboration (-): Business has
established at least one development-oriented
relationship by the end of the current record year
(TV)
Marketing collaboration (-): Business has established
at least one marketing-oriented relationship by the
end of the current record year (TV)
Other collaboration (+): Business has established at
least one other interfirm relationship by the end of
the current record year (TV)
Number of relationships (+): Number of collaborative
relationships that the business has established by
the beginning of the current record year (TV)
Development collaboration during shock (+): Business
operating in 1982 had established at least one
development-oriented relationship by that year,
recorded for each year that the business operated
between 1983 and 1991 (F)
Marketing collaboration during shock (-): Business
operating in 1982 had established at least one
marketing-oriented relationship by that year,
recorded for each year that the business operated
between 1983 and 1991 (F)
Independent during shock (-): Business operating in
1982 had established no relationships by that year,
recorded for each year that the business operated
between 1983 and 1991 (F)
Business sales during shock, collaborating (+):
Business sales during 1982 of businesses that used
collaborative relationships during that year,
recorded in each year that the business operated
between 1983 and 1991 ($ million deflated by
1982 PPJ, F)
Business sales during shock, independent (+):
Business sales during 1982 of businesses that did
not use collaborative relationships during that year,
recorded in each year that the business operated
between 1983 and 1991 ($ million deflated by
1982 PPI, F)
Business-level characteristics
Business age (+); Business age squared (-): Number
of years that the business has operated in the
industry, and squared term (TV)
Business sales (-): Annual hospital software systems
sales by the business ($ million deflated by 1982
PPJ, I-year lag, TV)
Business sales growth (-): One-year growth
(Growth, = Sales, - Sales'_I)
Number of products (0): Number of products listed
in Table I that the business offers (TV)
Entry by acquisition (0): Denotes businesses that
operated in the hospital software systems industry
under other ownership before current entry (F)
Prior corporate age (-): Corporate age (years) of the
parent company when the business entered the
hospital software systems industry under current
ownership (F)
Diversifying entry, hardware (+, relative to startup):
Firm had experience as manufacturer of computer
hardware industry before entering the hospital
software systems industry (F)
Diversifying entry, no hardware (+, relative to
startup): Firm had experience in industrial sectors
other than the computer hardware industry before
entering the hospital software systems industry (F)
Private (0): Privately held company (F)
Industry-level characteristics
Market size (-): Hospital software system sales ($
million deflated by 1982 PPI, TV )
Market growth (-): I-year growth rate of market size
(Market growth,=[Market size, - Market
size.,, ]/Market size I_I; Market growth 19 M = average
of 1962-63 growth; TV )
Industry exits: Number of businesses that shut down
during the prior year (TV)
"The expected influences reflect predictions in the text and results in Mitchell and Singh ( 1996).0
Tab le 4. Product moment correlations and summary statistics (6701 observations)
00
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
~ I Partner dissolution. year a I 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 - 0.01 0. \8 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.\5
2 Partner dissolution. years 1- 4 0.00 1 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 - 0.0 1 0.08 0.03 0.0 1 0.06 V) -.
3 Business adds partner after partner dissolution, years 0- 4 - 0.01 0.00 1 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.27 0.\ 3 0.14 0.2 1
;:s
C>Q
4 Partner divestiture, year 0 -0.01 - 0.0 1 - 0.01 I - 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.2\ 0.13 0.27 ;::;-
5 Partner divestiture, years 1- 4 - 0.01 -0.0 1 -0.01 - 0.02 I 0.12 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.\ 1 0.18 0.26 l::l ;:s
6 Partner adds partner. same type. year a 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.12 1 0.31 - 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.33 0.\8 0.57 l::l..
7 Partner adds partner. same type. years 1-4 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.3 1 I 0.06 - 0.Q7 - 0.09 0.18 0.\5 0.32 ~ 8 Partner adds partner. different type, year a 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.06 I 0.12 0.00 0.\ 1 0.\8 0.06
9 Partner adds partner. different type, years 1- 4 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.0 1 0.02 0.00 - 0.07 0.12 1 - 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.02 ~
10 Business adds partner after partner adds partner, years 0-4 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.18 0. 14 - 0.02 - 0.09 0.00 - 0.03 \ 0.34 0.34 0.42 ~.
I I Partner size 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.2 1 0. 11 0.33 0.\ 8 0.11 0.02 0.34 1 0.32 0.44
;::;-
'1:l
12 Development collaboration 0.08 0.01 0. 14 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.34 0.32 I 0.38 :::::
13 Marketing collaboration 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.57 0.32 0.06 0.02 0.42 0.44 0.38 I
14 Other collaboration 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.08 0. 18 0.08 0. 19 0.2 1 0.22 0.20
15 Number of relationships 0.08 0.04 0.38 0.25 0. 19 0.19 0.11 0.05 0.0 1 0.50 0.40 0.4 1 0.49
16 Development collaboration during shock 0.05 - 0.01 0.\5 0.Q7 0. 1\ 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.0 1 0.25 0.24 0.46 0.24
17 Marketing collaboration during shock 0.09 -0.01 0.21 0.11 0. 15 0. 12 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.40
18 Independent during shock - 0.01 - 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.0 1 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
19 Business sales during shock, collaborating 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.13 0. 16 0.03 0.04 0.Q7 0.00 0.25 0.Q7 0.\ 6 0.20
20 Business sales during shock. independent 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.26 0.16 0.11
21 Business age 0.09 0.01 0.18 0. 15 0. 18 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.35
22 Business sales 0.Q7 0.00 0.13 0. 12 0. 10 0.11 0.Q7 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.26
23 Business sales grow th 0.0 1 0.00 0.04 - 0.01 0.0 1 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.\0 0.Q7
24 Number of products 0.08 0.02 0.13 0. 15 0. 16 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.\9 0.30 0.37
25 Entry by acquisition -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.0 1 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 - 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
26 Prior corporate age -0.01 0.0 1 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.0 1 0.03 - 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.13 0. 10
27 Diversifying entry. hardware 0.0\ 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 - 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.05
28 Diversifying entry. no hardware 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04
29 Private - 0.04 - 0.02 - 0.09 - 0.07 - 0.09 - 0.06 -0.Q2 -0.Q7 - 0.02 - 0.16 - 0. 12 -0.20 - 0.15
30 Market size 0.05 0.03 0.Q7 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.14 0. 10 0.21
31 Market growth - 0.04 0.00 - 0.02 - 0.04 -0.05 - 0.06 - 0.04 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.03 -0.04 - 0.03 -0.08
32 Industry exits 0.Q7 0.02 0.Q7 0.07 0.08 0. 16 0.10 0.0 1 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.18
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.0 1 0.Q2 0.04 7.4 1 0.08 0. 15
Standard deviation 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.39 0.11 0.14 0.18 33.03 0.27 0.36
Minimum a a a a a 0 a a a a a a a
Maximum 1 \ I I 1 1 \ I 1 \ 339. 15 \ 1Table 4. Continued
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Table 5. Logistic regression estimates of influences on business dissolution
(positive coefficient indicates greater likelihood of shutting down; 6701 record years, 316 dissolutions)
Variable Column I Column 2
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Partner failure or new partnerships
Partner dissolution, year 0 1.661 0.699*** 1.901 0.728***
Partner dissolution, years 1-4 1.836 0.747*** 2.226 0.953***
Business adds partner after partner dissolution, years 0-4 1.112 1.050
Partner divestiture, year 0 0.788 0.594* 0.735 0.596
Partner divestiture, years 1-4 0.467 0.537 0.460 0.539
Partner adds partner, same type, year 0 -0.758 0.454** - 0.817 0.468**
Partner adds partner, same type, years 1-4 0.365 0.158** 0.350 0.159**
Partner adds partner, different type, year 0 1.189 0.537** 1.246 0.529***
Partner adds partner, different type, years 1-4 0.570 0.384* 0.632 0.383**
Business adds partner after partner adds partner, years 0-4 -1.177 1.064
Collaborative relationships
Partner size (x 100) -0.241 0.430 - 0.204 0.423
Development collaboration -1.471 0.507*** - 1.533 0.516***
Marketing collaboration -0.609 0.369** -0.540 0.367*
Other collaboration 0.019 0.419 0.103 0.412
Number of relationships 0.080 0.063 0.106 0.068*
Development collaboration during shock 1.479 0.882** 1.577 0.893**
Marketing collaboration during shock -1 .955 1.144** -1.999 1.1 50**
Independent during shock -0.376 0.175** -0.357 0.175**
Business sales during shock, collaborating 0.228 0.060*** 0.225 0.060***
Business sales during shock, independent 0.313 0.101*** 0.309 0.101***
Business-level characteristics
Business age 0.413 0.059*** 0.410 0.059***
Business age squared (x 100) -1 .890 0.370*** - 1.870 0.370***
Business sales - 0.590 0.078*** -0.590 0.078***
Business sales growth -0.065 0.017*** - 0.065 0.017***
Number of products 0.036 0.051 0.036 0.051
Entry by acquisition -0.512 0.381* - 0.529 0.384*
Prior corporate age -0.035 0.014*** - 0.034 0.014***
Diversifying entry, hardware (compared to startups) 1.331 0.323*** 1.317 0.324***
Diversifying entry, no hardware (compared to startups) 0.564 0.136*** 0.571 0.136***
Private -0.104 0.162 -0.111 0.162
Industry-level characteristics
Market size (x 1000) -0.200 0.141* - 0.210 0.141*
Market growth -2.812 0.796*** - 2.823 0.798***
Industry exits - 0.014 0.01I - 0.013 0.011
Intercept - 3.003 0.339*** - 2.991 0.339***
Model log likelihood - 1139.0 - 1137.1
Log likelihood chi-square statistic (d.f.) 269.2 273.0
(31) (33)
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed tests)Survival after Partners Fail or Form New Partnerships III
'Partner dissolution' variables and the four 'Part-
ner adds partner' variables to cases in which the
focal business did not add a new partner within
4 years . We also included the two 'Business adds
partner' variables in column 2, denoting cases in
which businesses added a new partner following
partner dissolution or following cases in which a
partner added a new partner. This procedure
allows us to distinguish between the effects of
differential response to partner failure and new
partnerships. The results in column 2 provide the
basis for testing the hypotheses.
Consistent with Hypothesis I, column 2 of
Table 5 shows that businesses become more
likely to shut down following the dissolution of
a partner if they do not add a new partner
themselves. As we discussed earlier. we dis-
tinguished between current year and subsequent
year effects in order to address the possibility
that two firms might shut down together due to
a common cause. The dissolution rate increased
during the record year in which a partner shut
down (Partner dissolution, year 0) and during the
cumulative period of the next 4 years (Partner
dissolution, years 1-4). Sensitivity analyses that
disaggregated the 'Partner dissolution, years 1-
4' variable also showed increased dissolution
rates. The pattern of results is consistent with our
argument. The results in year 0 might occur
because two weak collaborating businesses shut
down at the same time, but the continuing influ-
ence during the subsequent 4 years suggests that
a partner's exit has a negative impact on a busi-
ness's ability to operate. Partner divestiture had
only a weak influence on business dissolution.
The results suggest that businesses become more
likely to shut down following partner dissolution,
but that the capabilities of divested partners usu-
ally remain available to them.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the results in
column 2 of Table 5 also suggest that businesses
become more likely to shut down after a partner
adds a new partner if they do not add a new
partner themselves. We differentiated between
cases in which partners added partners of the
same type as an existing relationship or of a
different type (marketing oriented or development
oriented). For new partners of the same type, we
found that the dissolution rate declined during
the current record year (Partner adds partner,
same type, year 0), but then increased during the
subsequent 4 years (Partner adds partner, same
type, years 1-4). The negative current year result
suggests that the result does not stem from
reverse causality, in which partners would seek
new partners owing to the failure of their older
ally. The positive effect during the 4-year lag
period then suggests that businesses face
increased risk of dissolution for several years
after a partner adds a new partner for a similar
purpose to the existing agreement. For new part-
ners of a different type, we find that the disso-
lution rate increases during the current record
year (Partner adds partner, different type, year 0)
and in the subsequent 4-year period (Partner adds
partner, different type, years 1-4). The 'different
type' results suggest that partners sometimes add
new types of relationships during a product devel-
opment cycle when they have reached the end of
their need for an existing relationship. Overall,
the 'Partner adds partner' results in column 2
suggest that businesses face increased risk of
shutting down when their partners form collabo-
rative relationships with new partners.
Column 2 of Table 5 also reports the survival
influence of adding a partner after a partner shuts
down or adds a partner (Business adds partner
after partner dissolution, years 0-4; Business adds
partner after partner adds partner, years 0-4).
The coefficients of the 'Business adds partner'
variables do not differ significantly from zero.
Thus, in practice, businesses that added a new
partner in response to the failure or new partner-
ships of a partner neither suffered increased risk
of failure nor gained survival benefits. The non-
significant 'Business adds partner' results are con-
sistent with the argument that firms that form
new partnerships tend to overcome problems
caused when their partners fail or form new part-
nerships.
Column 2 of Table 5 also reports the influences
of the control variables. We did not detect any
impact of the size of the largest partner (Partner
size) on business dissolution. The sum of all
partners' sales, which strongly correlates with the
size of the largest partner, also had no influence
in sensitivity analyses. An implication of the size
result is that, although businesses might benefit
from using their partners' resources, they realize
greater chance of surviving only if they are able
to use those resources to gain sales themselves.
Thus, simply allying with a large business does
not help a business avoid dissolution and, con-
versely, allying with a small business does not
increase the chance of failure.112 K. Singh and W. Mitchell
means 'depending on the will of another'
(Kirkpatrick, 1983: 1010). We show that busi-
nesses that are unable to find new partners face
increased risk of dissolution for several years if
a collaborative partner shuts down or forms a
collaborative relationship with a new partner. The
results extend our understanding of the trade-off
of benefits and problems created by interfirm
collaboration and identify common situations in
which the negative aspects of collaboration
emerge. More generally, the study helps charac-
terize the interplay between adaptive and inertial
forces in business organizations, providing evo-
lutionary implications for business practice and
theory.
The study suggests that collaboration strategy
must be a central and carefully wrought part of
business practice, as firms must develop skills for
both collaborative and independent sourcing of
key resources. Despite its benefits, collaboration
is an imperfect process for acquiring resources,
both in the sense that collaborating businesses
often face difficulties and because any given col-
laboration is available to only a few businesses.
Businesses that are able to work closely with
current partners while at the same time identifying
possible new partners are likely to succeed in an
industry marked by ongoing technological change.
Such a dual orientation to collaboration manage-
ment has limits. One restraint is the risk of
offending an important current partner that might
compete with a business that is being courted for
a future relationship. In addition, it might be
difficult to establish two sets of commercialization
routines within a single business, with one set of
routines being oriented to close collaboration with
partners and the other to regular reevaluation of
independent approaches. Nonetheless, empirical
observation of businesses that consistently per-
form well in their industries while both main-
taining independent strength and forming many
interfirm relationships suggests that businesses
that create effective dual sourcing orientations
benefit. The ability of many Japanese businesses
to manage interfirm relationships appears to con-
tribute to their success in competition with many
North American and European companies. In the
U.S.A., meanwhile, some companies use interfirm
agreements as central parts of their ongoing busi-
ness strategies, while also maintaining strong
independent research and marketing capabilities.
How firms maintain a successful balance between
CONCLUSION
The collaborative relationship influences
reported in column 2 of Table 5 are consistent
with those reported by Mitchell and Singh (1996),
with coefficients having the same signs and simi-
lar significance. Most notably, businesses with
development or marketing relationships were less
likely to shut down than other businesses
(Development collaboration, Marketing collabora-
tion), although businesses using collaborative
relationships for activities central to an environ-
mental shock faced increased risk of dissolution
following the shock (Development collaboration
during shock). The positive main effects of col-
laboration are consistent with the argument that
collaboration provides substantial advantages. The
positive main effects of collaboration contradict
a possible counter argument to this study, which
is that weak businesses might be more likely
to collaborate than strong businesses. If weak
businesses tended to collaborate, then business
dissolutions that occurred following the failure or
new partnerships of a partner might stem from
the intrinsic weakness of the business rather than
from losing access to capabilities on which the
business had become dependent. If weak busi-
nesses were the most common collaborators, how-
ever, then collaboration should at best be associ-
ated with neutral survival chances, rather than
with the greater chance of survival shown by
the analysis. The business-level and industry-level
characteristics reported in column 2 of Table 5
also are consistent with those reported in prior
research.
The results reported here were materially equi-
valent in sensitivity analyses that investigated
other business-level and industry-level influences.
Several industry-level variables that sometimes
influence business and firm dissolution, including
business density and density at entry, correlate
highly with the market size, market growth, and
industry exit variables that we report. The density
variables did not increase the statistical fit of
the model.
This research demonstrates that interfirm collabo-
ration has opposing influences on business per-
formance. Businesses often benefit from collabo-
ration, but collaboration also places a firm in a
precarious position, in the sense that precariousSurvival after Partners Fail or Form New Partnerships 113
developing independent capabilities and con-
ducting effective collaborative relationships is an
important topic for further research.
Several avenues for continued research appear
relevant. This study does not directly examine
cases in which partners mutually or unilaterally
end relationships. Mutual decisions to end a
relationship are likely to have little or no negative
impact on the performance of either partner,
because it is unlikely that firms have a systematic
tendency to mistakenly end valuable relationships.
Similarly, firms that unilaterally end partnerships
are unlikely to systematically harm themselves
with these decisions. However, we expect that
businesses will often suffer from their partners'
unilateral termination of relationships. In addition,
further research might extend the analysis of
changes in partnership activity and terms, both
in terms of changes in the dyadic relationships
between pairs of firms and in terms of changes
in the broader network of relationships among
many firms.
At its most general level, the research contrib-
utes to a theoretical understanding of the evo-
lution of business strategy and performance. Our
study demonstrates how a business's past
decisions and those of its partners affect its cur-
rent performance. The study shows that interfirm
collaboration, either through its termination or its
addition, influences business strategy and per-
formance, and through these processors affects
industry structure.
Advancing the theoretical understanding of
business strategy and performance requires greater
theoretical understanding of the role of collabo-
ration in developing business capabilities. Tra-
ditionally, most discussions of interfirm collabo-
ration viewed the agreements primarily as
collusive and power-based relationships. In many
or most industries, however, technical and market
changes occur too rapidly for interfirm collabo-
ration to provide effective market power or
organizational dominance. Instead, collaborative
agreements often provide means for firms to gain
quick and effective access to needed capabilities.
The role of business capabilities has received
increasing attention during the past decade. Many
researchers have followed Penrose's (1959) semi-
nal work to argue that much of a business's
advantage stems from its possession of nonimi-
table business-specific resources (e.g., Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986;
Conner, 1991; Nelson, 1991; Amit and Schoe-
maker, 1993; Nelson and Dosi, 1993; Teece and
Pisano, 1994). The resource-based approach
argues that business boundaries result more from
the idiosyncratic resources that firms create over
time and less from discrete choices about which
resources to internalize at a given time. Strategists
and organizational theorists dating to Commons
(1934), Coase (1937), Barnard (1938), Selznick
(1948), Simon (1957), and others, however, have
long recognized that no one business can create
all critical resources needed to prosper and grow.
Instead, collaboration among businesses that pos-
sess complementary resources is often necessary
for survival and growth.
The need for interfirm collaboration to acquire
and manage resources gives rise to contradictory
influences on business strategy and performance.
First, collaborative relationships provide sources
of competitive advantage because they are diffi-
cult for competing firms to replicate, owing both
to the tacit nature of collaboration and to restric-
tions on collaboration imposed by legal, social,
and competitive requirements. Second, in contrast,
interfirm collaborative relationships create organi-
zational and institutional constraints on business
adaptation. The systematically contradictory na-
ture of interfirm relationships, which both help a
business survive in one environment and inhibit
its ability to adapt to new environments, has a
substantial impact on industry evolution and helps
explain why so many successful businesses fail
when their environments change. Continuing
study of interfirm relationships is essential to
develop a robust understanding of business strat-
egy and performance.
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